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by Morten Balling
Chairman of the Editorial Board
Professor, Department of Finance,
The Aarhus School of Business
Safeguarding financial stability is a main task for central bankers and
regulators. The world in which monetary authorities fulfil this task is
changing rapidly. A change in the environment with truly long-term
implications for monetary policy is the enlargement of the European Union.
The authorities of the EU-accession countries must in the year 2003 and in the
years to come assess their institutional and policy frameworks in order to
determine if they are able to meet the challenges in a large and competitive
financial market environment characterised by free capital movements and an
increasing importance of multinational financial institutions.
The three papers in this SUERF Study were presented in March 2003 at
a SUERF seminar in Malta: Securing Financial Stability: Problems and
Prospects for New EU Members. The authors of the papers analyse the
conditions under which the monetary authorities of the EU-accession
countries can expect to operate in the future and they give a series of policy
recommendations.
Michael C. Bonello (Governor, Central Bank of Malta) gives an overview of
current issues in financial stability policy. Short-term capital movements and
asset price bubbles are potential threats to stability. Risks to stability need not
originate within the financial system itself. A healthy macroeconomic
environment is necessary. The confidence of market participants relies on
a prudent fiscal policy and a stability-oriented exchange rate policy. The
efficiency of monetary policy depends on the effectiveness of the
transmission channels in the financial system. Policy transparency and good
governance are also important. The likelihood of disturbances to the financial
system can be greatly diminished if the authorities are transparent and state
their policy intentions clearly. If they do that, investors and creditors become
better informed. This aspect is especially relevant in exchange rate policy.
Transparency and good governance also apply at corporate level. Disclosure
5requirements and market discipline play an important supplementary role to
prudential controls of the well-being of the financial system.
EU financial market integration presents both new opportunities and some
risks. Accession countries will, by participating in the single currency area,
become immune to currency misalignment episodes that disturb trade and
currency risk premiums will disappear from interest rates. Deeper and more
liquid financial markets offer risk diversification opportunities. Entry of
competitive foreign banks can be expected to improve the efficiency and
functioning of indigenous banks. During the integration process, the
distinction between different types of financial institutions and markets will
become increasingly blurred. This means an increasing need for all
institutions with financial stability responsibilities to co-ordinate their efforts.
At EU level, co-operation between national supervisory authorities is strongly
needed. In his conclusion, the Governor underlines the special interest of
accession countries in keeping at bay forces which are known to be inimical
to financial stability and in adopting structures and practices which have
proved effective in countries which have already completed their journey to
EMU.
In the introduction of his paper, Fabrizio Saccomanni (Vice President,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) distinguishes between
ensuring financial stability at the EU level and at the level of the international
monetary and financial system respectively. Episodes of instability have not
been exclusively in emerging and transition countries. They have also
occurred in mature economies such as Japan and the United States. There are
“systemic” shortcomings in global financial markets. From time to time
financial intermediaries demonstrate “herd behaviour” which may contribute
to financial contagion. Financial flows to emerging markets have shown
considerable volatility. The issue of capital flows volatility is a concern for all
regions of emerging markets. The EU accession countries have received very
large foreign direct investment (FDI) flows over the last ten years. This must
be understood in the context of a relatively strong economic performance and
the ongoing convergence process.
The size and volatility of capital flows represent a potential risk to financial
stability in the accession countries. Portfolio investors may speculate on
interest rate convergence and exchange rate appreciation, but flows driven by
speculative considerations can be quickly reversed with damaging
consequences to the health of individual financial institutions. Increased
integration of financial markets after accession may intensify the risk of
6 Introductioncontagion. The accession countries made remarkable progress in transforming
their financial sectors in the 1990s. Due to privatisation and an obliging
policy with respect to entrance of foreign investors and banks, there have
been dramatic changes in the structure of ownership. Today, the banking
sector in the region is characterised by a high degree of foreign ownership.
Banking efficiency is improving, but remains lower than in the EU countries.
On the agenda for financial stability, the first item is improvement of the risk
management of individual intermediaries. Next, financial authorities must
strengthen prudential supervisory techniques and procedures to prevent crisis
situations or to manage them. Under the present configuration of the
international monetary and financial system there is a risk that financial
instability could have systemic implications. Supervisory authorities have
traditionally followed a “microprudential” approach while the problem they
have to deal with is of a “macroprudential” nature. By referring to recent
analytical contributions from the BIS and ECB, the author recommends
a strengthening of the co-operation among central banks and supervisory
authorities on a macroprudential approach to ensuring financial stability. He
recommends a certain degree of policy activism. The risk perception of
market participants should be affected in a stabilising way. Securing financial
stability in a globalised international economy will be quite challenging for
national monetary authorities and for the institutions of international
cooperation.
Claudia M. Buch and Jörn Kleinert (Kiel Institute of World Economics) and
Peter Zajc (University of Ljubljana) analyse the link between financial
integration and the stability of financial markets in Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs) that arises through the diversification of
national liquidity shocks in their paper. The authors distinguish between
cross-border lending and FDI in financial services. While FDI involves higher
fixed costs than cross-border lending, it also provides banks with better access
to local lending markets. The strong financial integration of CEECs with EU
countries has implications for financial stability. Liquidity risks can be
diversified. By drawing on a model developed by Allen and Gale, the authors
explain that the impact of financial integration on financial stability in the
accession countries depends on the regional structure of financial integration,
the correlation of liquidity shocks between regions and the depth of
integration. Data show that German, Austrian and Scandinavian banks are
very important lenders to CEECs. They are also deeply involved in FDIs in
the region. The correlations of liquidity shocks between the CEECs and the
Western European countries are relatively low. The implication is that the
Introduction 7CEECs can profit from further financial integration with the EU. Due regard
should be taken, however, to the large difference in size of the two regions
and the relatively large market shares of foreign banks in the CEECs. The
authors conclude that FDIs in banking have important stabilising features.
Together, the three papers provide the reader with a solid background for
understanding the challenges that face the monetary and supervisory
authorities in the EU accession countries in the years to come.
Morten Balling
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9In today’s globalized world where private financial flows, facilitated by
market deregulation and electronic trading, have become a substantial
multiple of merchandise trade, safeguarding financial stability represents an
increasingly complex policy challenge. For the central banking community in
the accession countries, the wider scope of liberalisation implied by the rules
of the Single Market and, in particular, by the EU Financial Services Action
Plan, adds a further dimension to this challenge. Of particular relevance in
this regard are the liberalisation of capital flows and the free movement of
services, processes which are already well underway in our countries. It is,
therefore, particularly appropriate that central bankers, regulators and others
having an interest in financial stability should come together on the eve of EU
enlargement to assess the adequacy of the institutional and policy frameworks
within which they operate.
1. Current issues in financial stability
Today, it is generally accepted that a well-developed and healthy financial
system is a prerequisite for sustained growth, not least because of its
intermediary role between savers and borrowers and its ability to diversify
risks. A sound financial system also contributes to exchange rate stability by
way of its stabilising effects on external trade and financial flows and is, of
course, necessary for the effective transmission of monetary policy.
As the size and importance of financial systems have grown, so have the
sources of potential threats to their stability. Apart from the magnitude of
short-term private funds which move across the globe daily, financial stability
stands to be undermined by the emergence of such factors as asset price
bubbles and by the blurring of the erstwhile distinction between financial
markets and institutions, developments which complicate the task of the
authorities charged with overseeing the financial system.
Clearly, “financial stability” has assumed a much broader meaning than that
implied by the terms “financial supervision” and “banking stability”, with
which it used to be associated in the past. These wider ramifications of the
concept are well captured, I believe, by the definition proposed by
Mr Malcolm Knight, the Senior Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada who
11is soon to take over as General Manager of the Bank for International
Settlements. He defines a stable financial system as one in which all
economic agents – households, business firms, financial services firms and
government – can confidently hold and transfer financial assets without
experiencing serious risks of disturbances that undermine financial values or
repayment prospects.
1
The notion which this definition conveys very clearly is that risks to stability
need not originate within the financial system itself. In particular, while
a sound clearing and payment system and regulatory framework remain vital
prerequisites, a healthy macroeconomic environment characterised by stable
prices, interest rates and exchange rates is equally necessary for financial
stability. These variables also affect the exposures of different entities to
various categories of risk. This is very much what we observe in practice,
where even imbalances arising in some other sector often create ripple effects
throughout the financial system and, where this is not robust enough, in the
rest of the economy.
Consistent with this view, it can be argued that financial stability is best
pursued by implementing a coherent set of policies which respond to the
underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. Recent episodes of financial crisis,
for example, have shown that through their effects on expectations and on
asset prices more generally, unchecked variations in property prices can
contribute to precipitating a crisis. Similarly, it is often forgotten that
a combination of excessive public deficits with an over reliance on short-term
capital flows and an overvalued currency is the perfect recipe for a turnaround
in market confidence, and consequently for sudden reversals in capital flows.
Nonetheless, of all the possible links between financial stability and the other
objectives of macroeconomic policy, it is the one between the two key
functions of central banks – price stability and financial stability – which has
received most attention – and this for very good reasons. For a start, we know
from experience that inflation brings about distortions in the allocation of
resources, and such misallocation is incompatible with the achievement of
financial stability on a sustainable basis. We have also learnt that the
efficiency of monetary policy depends on the effectiveness of the
transmission channels. Central banks can only influence short-term interest
12 Current issues in financial stability
1 Knight., M. 2002. “The Central Bank’s Role in Fostering Financial System Stability:
A Canadian Perspective”, in Financial Risks, Stability and Globalization; ed. O.E.G. Johnson.
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. p. 314.rates. The ultimate impact upon prices of monetary policy decisions travels
over time through various channels in the financial system, and uncertainty
could ensue if these channels do not function efficiently. Another reason for
this focus of attention could be that while the supervisory function has been
relocated outside central banks in many countries, responsibility for the
maintenance of systemic stability remains with central banks.
The relationship between financial and monetary stability is not, however,
necessarily limited to complementarities. In a situation characterised by both
rising inflationary pressures and tight liquidity conditions, for example,
a decision to raise interest rates would be consistent with the central
bank’s price stability objective, but could also affect the profitability of credit
institutions. It is thus hardly surprising that one of the topical issues facing
central banks today concerns the appropriate weight that should be given to
financial stability considerations in the formulation of monetary policy. From
a broader policymaking perspective, moreover, there is also the question
about the role that financial stability concerns should play in the formulation
of macroeconomic policy more generally. I am sure that the second seminar
session will provide further insights in this regard, when the interrelationship
between fiscal policy, monetary policy and financial stability will be
considered.
Current issues in financial stability 132. Policy transparency, good governance and market
discipline
The relationship between macroeconomic policy and financial stability also
serves to highlight the importance of policy transparency and good
governance, both at the national and corporate level. In fact, it is generally
agreed that the likelihood of disturbances to the financial system can be
greatly diminished if the authorities manifest their policy intentions clearly,
and explain the rationale behind policy measures once decisions have been
taken. This helps to reduce the chances of investors and creditors making
uninformed decisions, only to reverse them later. This aspect has become
especially relevant in the context of capital account liberalisation, particularly
in those countries that operate variants of fixed exchange rate regimes. It is
even more so in countries which are simultaneously engaged in efforts to
place public finances on a stable footing and to gain credibility for the central
bank’s monetary policy. Here, a sudden shift in investor confidence could
have serious repercussions, not only for financial stability, but also for the
conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. Within this context it is relevant to note
that while in general accession countries have made significant progress
towards achieving macroeconomic stability, this progress has been far from
uniform and challenges remain in this respect too.
The relevance of transparency and good governance also applies at the
corporate level, not least because financial difficulties in large corporations
could undermine the well-being of individual financial institutions and
markets. This is especially the case in small jurisdictions. Now it is a fact that
corporations will always know a lot more about their financial position than
any outside entity charged with monitoring them, and financial intermediaries
are no exception in this regard. This is particularly true at a time when the
complexity of financial products and the intensity of cross-market risks are
stretching the capacity of central bankers and supervisors to remain fully in
control. Several recent episodes in the financial world indeed confirm that the
innate human predisposition to maximise self-interest can induce behaviour
that is not in harmony with the public interest.
The implications of this are two-fold. While rules and regulations continue to
play an important role in preventing systemic shocks, they will increasingly
have to incorporate incentives and credible deterrents to discourage excessive
14risk-taking and moral hazard. Second, the efforts of central bankers and
supervisors need to be supplemented with direct oversight by the stakeholders
of financial institutions themselves, be they shareholders, creditors or
customers. Stated otherwise, good governance and market discipline are
becoming at least as important as prudential controls for the well-being of the
financial system. That, in turn, calls for a host of other measures ranging from
the regular disclosure by the institutions of detailed information about their
performance and the adoption of international accounting standards to the
enforcement of shareholder rights, the creation of deposit insurance and
investor protection schemes and the simplification of judicial procedures.
Policy transparency, good governance and market discipline 153. EU financial market integration presents new
opportunities but also some risks
While it is recognised that the well-being of the financial system has come to
depend on a host of factors, the regulatory and institutional framework in
place continues to play an important role both in crisis prevention and
management. The prospect of EU membership has already contributed
significantly in this regard, spurring accession countries to evaluate the
adequacy of the framework governing the financial sector. Perhaps more
important is the fact that the on-going harmonisation of rules and practices
with EU standards in the area of financial stability will provide market
players with an added assurance that this framework will continue to evolve
in line with international best practice.
This assurance should also facilitate the further development of the financial
sector in these countries, as foreign banks and other financial services
providers seek to tap what is soon to become an enlarged market of almost
500 million people, either directly by setting up shop in these countries or
indirectly through the cross-border provision of financial services. The
advantages for financial stability of a diversified financial structure are
well-documented. Suffice it to recall that because different financial market
segments react differently to economic shocks, the presence of different types
of intermediaries and markets functioning alongside each other should
strengthen the financial system’s capacity to absorb liquidity shocks
emanating from specific institutions or market segments. For accession
countries, the scope for diversification presented by EU membership is
significant, not only because the financial sector tends to be small relative to
their economic size, but more so because intermediation in these countries is
dominated by the banks. In fact, a recent ECB report concludes that the
financial sectors of accession countries could assimilate a fifteen-fold
increase in absolute terms.
2
Financial integration in the euro area, moreover, may also promote financial
stability in the accession countries through the advantages inherent in a single
16
2 Caviglia., G., G. Krause and C. Thimann. 2002. Key Features of the financial sectors in EU
accession countries, in C. Thimann (ed.) Financial Sectors in EU Accession Countries, Frankfurt:
European Central Bank.currency area. For a start, the disruption arising from currency risk is
eliminated, domestic economies become immune to currency misalignment
episodes that disturb trade and currency risk premiums disappear from
interest rates. A large currency area, furthermore, means deeper and more
liquid financial markets, which allow participants to diversify their risks and,
in the absence of currency risk, to focus more on credit risk.
Another contribution which EU membership should make to financial
stability in accession countries stems from the increased competition which
will result from the entry of foreign service providers, particularly if this
induces indigenous institutions to find innovative ways to hedge risks and
diversify asset portfolios, and to adopt international best practices generally.
While cross-country studies on this aspect remain sparse, a recent World
Bank study
3 reveals instances where foreign bank entry did lead to improved
operations and to greater access to foreign capital. Drawing on data for
80 countries, this study also shows that foreign bank entry does tend to reduce
domestic bank profitability, non-interest income and, to some extent, overall
expenses. Coupled with the finding that the presence of foreign banks
contributes to a higher level of loan-loss provisioning, this leads the authors
to conclude that, through its effects on competition, foreign bank entry
improves the efficiency and functioning of indigenous banks. While there is
nothing automatic about the realisation of such benefits, one might reasonably
expect that in the long run the completion of the Single Market in financial
services should contribute to the emergence of a healthier financial system in
the accession countries.
Now it could of course also be argued that the extension of the “single
passport” to most aspects of the provision of financial services foreseen by
the Financial Services Action Plan could well expose the accession countries
to new risks, particularly those emanating from within the EU itself, with
which these countries are already closely integrated. Indeed, the ECB has
itself recently stated that the integration of financial markets in the region
could increase the chances of systemic disturbances affecting more than one
Member State.
4 In this regard, Dr Buch’s paper on the implications for
EU financial market integration presents new opportunities but also some risks 17
3 Claessens., S., A. Demirguc-Kunt and H. Huizinga. 1998 (rev 2000). How does Foreign
Entry Affect the Domestic Banking Market? World Bank Working Paper No. 1918. Washington:
World Bank.
4 European Central Bank. 2003. Press Release on the Memorandum of Understanding on
high-level principles of co-operation between the banking supervisors and central banks of the
European Union in crisis management situations. Frankfurt, 10 March.financial stability of foreign bank entry should help to place the discussion in
an empirical context.
Another important aspect of financial market integration relates to regulation
and supervision. As the process intensifies, the distinction between different
types of financial institutions and markets will become increasingly blurred.
In such a scenario, it will be even more important for all institutions with
financial stability responsibilities – be it the central bank, supervisory
authority or other government agency – to co-ordinate their efforts in the area
of system oversight and to share any information which could be relevant to
the proper fulfilment of their respective functions. Indeed, whereas until
recently the prevailing concern related to the choice of institutional
arrangement for the supervision of the financial sector, it is now sometimes
argued that it is not the institutional framework which matters most, but rather
the existence of adequate mechanisms guaranteeing the exchange of
information and policy co-ordination between the entities responsible for
overseeing systemic stability and those that monitor the health of individual
financial institutions. Beyond that, it is claimed, any institutional set-up can
work. Likewise, any one can fail.
While this conclusion might be valid from a national point of view, it does
little to address the question of whether information exchange and policy
co-ordination relating to financial sector developments affecting the EU as
a whole would be more appropriately addressed by a supranational EU
institution with supervisory responsibilities, or whether such tasks are best
handled by the national authorities of member countries. This issue has
certainly gained in importance in recent years with the increased recognition
of the links between supervision and monetary policy. It has served to
highlight the anomaly between, on the one hand, the institutional framework
governing monetary policy in the region, which is centralised in the ECB,
and, on the other hand, the framework governing financial sector supervision,
which is largely decentralised. The signing earlier this year of a Memorandum
of Understanding on co-operation in the area of crisis management between
the supervisory authorities and the central banks of the 15 Member States has
underlined the links between these two functions even more.
Now some might conclude that if it has been possible to devise a mechanism
for crisis management in the EU without the need to create a supranational
supervisory body, it should be equally possible to develop a similar
co-operative arrangement for crisis prevention. On the other hand, it could
also be argued that, not having had the experience of a financial crisis in the
18 EU financial market integration presents new opportunities but also some risksregion, it is still too early to say whether such an arrangement would work in
practice. Accession countries have a special interest in this matter, not only
because their central banks and supervisory authorities will be invited to sign
this accord, but because they will in time also have to adhere to whatever
institutional arrangements are adopted by the EU in this area.
EU financial market integration presents new opportunities but also some risks 194. Conclusion
The issues being discussed during this seminar are wide-ranging indeed. And
though they are not of interest exclusively to policy makers in accession
countries, financial stability issues are especially pertinent for these countries,
since they aim to meet the requirements for adopting the single currency as
soon as possible after joining the EU in May 2004. First, because the
existence of a positive link between financial system stability and economic
growth means that anything that harms stability would slow down the pace of
real convergence with the EU economy. Second, because the break out of
a systemic crisis has immediate effects on asset prices and other price
variables, it could also imperil the nominal convergence process and, with
that, an early entry in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Accession countries, therefore, have a specific interest in keeping at bay
forces which are known to be inimical to financial stability and in adopting
structures and practices which have proved effective in countries which have
already completed their journey to EMU. It is thus appropriate that the
seminar should be brought to an end with presentations on the experiences of
three euro area member countries.
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1 I would like to express my gratitude to my colleagues Francesca Pissarides and Anita Taci of
the EBRD’s Office of the Chief Economist for their valuable assistance in the drafting of the paper.
I retain sole responsibility for the opinions expressed in this paper.1. Introduction
Financial stability is a pre-requisite for the optimal allocation of resources.
Consumer and investment decisions are misguided by the distorted asset
prices, which characteristically precede a financial crisis. The ability of the
financial sector to attract savings and channel them to the productive
economy is eroded during a period of financial instability. Inevitably, this
leads to output losses, the size and duration of which can eventually have an
impact on the ability of traditional economic policy instruments to reverse the
crisis.
Ensuring financial stability in an enlarged European Union (EU) – the subject
of this highly topical SUERF seminar – is an issue that can be addressed at
two distinct levels. At the level of the EU, it means that individual member
states, both “old” and “new”, must endeavour to ensure that their banking and
financial systems are sound, efficient, competitive and well regulated,
consistent with the objective of full financial integration in Europe. These are
challenging tasks, but at least they are sufficiently clear in terms of their
policy implications. But in the context of globalisation, ensuring financing
stability is a task that must be addressed also at the level of the international
monetary and financial system. Here the policy implications are much less
clear, since, with the process of globalisation the very nature of the “system”
has been undergoing major changes in its institutional foundations and in its
“rules of the game”. Despite these difficulties I will try to address the seminar
topic from both viewpoints.
This paper is organised as follows: in section 2, I will briefly review the recent
evolution of the international monetary and financial system in the context of
globalisation and examine current trends in international capital flows.
Section 3 will survey the process of reform in the banking and financial
sectors in the prospective new member countries of the EU and will identify
potential risks to financial stability. In Section 4, I will raise some outstanding
analytical and policy issues that will have to be tackled in the fora of
international economic cooperation in order to achieve lasting conditions of
monetary and financial stability.
272. Recent evolution of the international monetary
and financial system
The gradual establishment of conditions of financial globalisation in the
1980’s has coincided with the intensification of episodes of instability, with
significant international repercussions. These episodes have been associated
with large unidirectional movements in the price of assets, such as real estate,
bonds, shares, currencies, followed by sharp reversals leading to significant
disruptions in the orderly functioning of financial markets, the bankruptcy of
intermediaries or, in some cases, to the suspension of the debt servicing
obligations of major sovereign borrowers. Contrary to popular belief, these
episodes have not occurred only in emerging or transition countries, but have
involved also mature economies, like Japan, or affected efficient markets like
the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ or the international bond market.
Currency misalignments have not been concentrated in Latin America or
South East Asia, but have at one time or another affected the three key
currencies of the world monetary system: the dollar, the euro and the yen.
Although the triggering factors for the outburst of crises have been closely
connected with specific imbalances in individual countries or markets, the
alternation of situations of excessive credit expansion with phases of sudden
credit contraction, typical of such crises, has been increasingly linked to
“systemic” shortcomings of global financial markets.
2 These include the
tendency by global players to underestimate and, therefore, to “underprice”
the risk of financial operations and the tendency to overestimate the degree of
liquidity of markets; moreover, competitive pressures lead to “herd
behaviour” of intermediaries which may result in phenomena of financial
contagion. In turn, the tendency of markets to generate “boom and bust”
cycles has been associated with the monetary policy stances adopted by the
major key currency countries (i.e. the US, the Eurozone and Japan) whose
28
2 Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomanni (1994) have suggested that with the generalised move to
floating exchange rates and the progress in financial liberalisation, a “market-led international
monetary system” has emerged from the ashes of the old “government-led system” of Bretton
Woods. Under such new system, global financial markets determine the creation and distribution
of international liquidity and the level of exchange rates. Following the Asian crisis of 1997, these
questions have been the subject of in depth analysis by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
its periodical World Economic Outlook reports and in the Annual Reports of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS).influences have been amplified and propagated by financial intermediaries,
thus influencing the direction of international capital flows (Saccomanni,
2002).
Under these circumstances, financial flows to emerging markets have shown
considerable volatility, as is clearly visible in Figure 1. These developments
are well known, and I would like to highlight just a few aspects which may
be relevant for the issue under discussion in this Seminar.
Figure 1
Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets (billions of US Dollars)
Source: Institute of International Finance, 2003.
Afirst aspect is that since the Asian-Russian crisis of 1997–98, there has been
a drastic decline of private financial flows to emerging markets, signalling
a generalised phenomenon of risk aversion, in particular with regard to
banking flows. This is quite different from the situation prevailing after the
Mexican crisis of 1994, when private flows to emerging countries recorded
only a temporary decline and resumed a strong growing pattern in 1995–96.
Such a risk aversion attitude towards emerging markets is all the more
significant in the present circumstances of abundant liquidity in international









1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002f 2003f
Direct investment, net Portfolio investment, net Total equity investment, net
Private creditors, net Nonbanks, net
Recent evolution of the international monetary and financial system 29Asecond notable aspect is that since 1999 even the more stable component of
capital flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), has shown a moderately
declining pattern. This development is probably a consequence of the way in
which the debt crisis has been managed in Argentina: the disregard of
investors’rights and the vicissitudes of the negotiations on debt restructuring
have increased the long-term risk perception of investors and contributed to
a sharp decline in foreign direct investments in Argentina. In 2001 the FDI
flows in Argentina declined to around a quarter of 2000 levels (from
$11.2 billion in 2000 to $3.2 billion in 2001).
Although the experience has differed at the regional level, the issue of capital
flows volatility is a concern for all regions of emerging markets. Political and
economic turbulence in Latin America, accompanied by weak equity market
performance and increased bond spreads, led to a sharp decline (by half) of
total net capital flows of that region over the past year (in all its components).
In emerging Asia, a significant economic performance has attracted larger
capital inflows. However, if one deducts FDI to China, which accounts for
about 85 per cent of the total, very little new direct investment flows have
gone to the rest of the region.
In transition countries, macroeconomic stability and reform progress have
attracted private investment, including a growing proportion of portfolio
flows which are more prone to volatility. Among transition economies,
accession countries received 60 per cent of FDI flows to the region, as they
are considered an attractive risk in view of the institutional linkages with the
EU and the prospect of continuing strong economic performances in the
context of the convergence process.
Even among accession countries, a significant episode of FDI volatility has
been recorded. In Hungary, after a decade of significant foreign direct
investment inflows (an average of 4.5 per cent of GDP over the 1991–2001
period), the absence of new privatization deals, combined with the protracted
exclusion of foreign investors from large public sector investments in
infrastructure and a lack of transparency in public procurement practices led
to a drastic drop in FDI to 1 per cent of GDP in 2002.
The conclusion I would like to draw from these considerations is that
volatility of financial flows to emerging markets is likely to stay, at least for
the foreseeable future, and will continue to affect, albeit in differing degrees,
all components of international capital movements.
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new EU member countries
In this Section, I would like to review the status of financial sector reform in
the new EU members, the potential sources of instability and the remaining
policy agenda after accession. Many of the issues raised here affect in
particular the transition economies among the accession countries, as Malta
and Cyprus have fairly advanced financial sectors. Some of the challenges,
however, are common to all EU members, both new and old.
3.1 Overview of financial sector reform and development
The accession countries have made remarkable progress in transforming their
financial sectors in the 1990’s. There have been significant achievements in
the privatization and restructuring of state banks in most of these countries;
there has been the exit of failing institutions and entry and development of
new domestic and foreign banks; there has been improvement in the legal,
supervisory and regulatory framework, which has supported enhanced
competition in the provision of banking services.
Despite this significant progress, the financial sector still lags behind in terms
of the scale and scope of their provision of financial services. Financial systems
have developed more as ‘bank-based’systems than as ‘market-based’systems,
with the banking sector being the major provider of financial services.
Nonetheless, the size of the banking sector is still generally small, both in
relative and in absolute terms, in comparison with the current EU member
countries. The ratio of banking assets to GDP ranges between 32 per cent
(Lithuania) and 130 per cent (Czech Republic) compared to 240 per cent in the
euro area. Only in Malta and Cyprus, where this ratio stands at about 230 and
250 per cent of GDP respectively, is it comparable to the euro area average.
The banking sector in the region is characterised by a high degree of foreign
ownership (on average 71 per cent of assets in the accession countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, and ranging from 16 per cent in Slovenia to
about 98 per cent in Estonia). This is a significant difference with the euro
area banking sector, where, for historical and cultural factors, foreign
ownership accounts, on average, for only 20% of assets. Foreign ownership
has the advantage of bringing in needed capital, know-how and best practices
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competition in state controlled sectors and significantly strengthened the
banking system against spill-over of crises in other emerging markets.
However, foreign-ownership has not been necessarily conducive to a more
active role in lending to the real economy. The degree of bank intermediation
in all accession countries has in fact contracted since restructuring and
privatization took place, albeit to a different extent among countries, and only
in very recent years has it again risen. The low level of bank intermediation
is explained primarily by the prudent behaviour of banks vis-à-vis clients
lacking the appropriate risk-return profile; however, the lack of long-term
funding, poor credit skills and weak enforcement of the legal framework for
creditor protection also played a role. Moreover, the large presence of foreign
banks has not reduced the relatively high proportion of non-performing loans
(ranging from 1.5 per cent in Estonia to 24 per cent of total loans in Slovakia).
The range of financial services provided by the banking sector in accession
countries (except for Cyprus where banks provide the full range of financial
services) is also very limited compared to that of developed market
economies. The degree of availability and terms of mortgage finance and
other consumer finance (credit card, electronic banking, etc.) make these
services accessible only to a very small fraction of the population. Leasing,
a suitable financing tool for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), has
not really taken off in some countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania), and in
others it is available only on a short-term basis.
Furthermore, even in the most advanced countries of the region, banking
efficiency remains lower than that in the EU countries despite some progress.
A significant indicator is the spread between lending and deposit rates which
at the end of 2001, ranged from 4.1 per cent in the Czech Republic to
17 per cent in Romania, compared to an average of 3.3 per cent for the euro
area. Only in Malta and Hungary has banking efficiency improved
considerably and the lending deposits spreads are also below the euro area
average (2.0 and 2.9 per cent respectively).
The relative underdevelopment of the banking sector in accession countries is
not compensated for by a strong non-bank financial sector or by thriving
capital markets. If anything, the degree of underdevelopment of capital
markets and non-bank financial institutions is greater than that of the banking
system. Stock markets exist in all the accession countries, as does the relevant
legal and regulatory framework to support them. However, their growth has
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economies, and in some cases they have actually shrunk in recent years.
Moreover, they are dominated mainly by large companies and do not manage
to offer a meaningful opportunity for allocation of savings, nor provide
a reliable source of finance for local companies or an exit route for foreign
investors. The dominance of foreign investors constitutes an element of
volatility as they are highly exposed to global market sentiment. Domestic
players are few, both institutional and individual. Reform of the pension
systems in these countries has only recently started and pension funds are
generally reluctant to take risks, having been scarred by poor performing
stock investments in the first half of the 1990s. Because of the thinness of
these markets, the best firms opt to be listed abroad rather than domestically.
Moreover, the legal and regulatory environment still needs to be further
developed in order to lower barriers to both entry and exit.
3.2 Potential sources of financial sector instability
From the short overview of financial sector development in accession
countries it is possible to conclude that the goal of becoming EU members has
accelerated the reform process of the financial sector in these countries in an
unprecedented way. However, additional challenges may arise as a result of
the process of financial integration in the EU.
A first potential risk to financial stability in accession countries relates to the
size and volatility of capital flows which is expected to increase, with the
prospect of total liberalisation of capital account and the eventual adoption of
the single currency in the context of EMU membership. Large capital flows
may have a negative effect on the financial sector of accession countries,
especially on the banking sector which is the major channel for their
intermediation (Buiter and Taci, 2003). Capital inflows into the banking
sector may fuel rapid credit expansion, with banks being increasingly exposed
to credit and foreign exchange risks and to maturity mismatches in foreign
currencies. Heavy inflows can also lead to excessive real exchange rate
appreciation, potentially eroding competitiveness and resulting in
deterioration in performance of some of the banks’ clients, with possible
negative repercussions on debt repayments, with more bad loans there
appearing on the banks’balance sheet. More generally, rapid growth of assets
strains banks’ capacity to assess risk adequately.
The perceived sustainability of policies in the prospect of the EU/EMU
accession, may also affect the composition of capital inflows. In particular,
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conditions and currency appreciation may attract an increasing flow of
short-term and portfolio capital. For at least a year now, the accession
countries have been the subject of ‘convergence plays’ by external portfolio
investors and domestic borrowers, especially local banks.
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driven by speculative considerations can be quickly reversed once the
arbitrage opportunity ceases to exist. With a build-up of cross-border and
foreign currency transactions, sudden and large reversals of capital flows or
large currency movements can have damaging consequences on the health of
individual financial institutions. Moreover, shifts in sentiment, leverage, and
liquidity problems can multiply and transmit shocks throughout the financial
system. The re-emergence of twin fiscal and current account deficits in some
accession countries (as in the Slovak Republic and in Hungary) points to the
risk of a sudden reversal in investor confidence. Local banks with hard
currency liabilities and local currency assets will be highly vulnerable to
a sudden depreciation of the exchange rate due to reversal of capital flows.
The increased integration of financial markets after accession also intensifies
the risk of contagion through financial channels. In a more financially
integrated market, events in other EU countries may have a destabilising
impact on countries with relatively underdeveloped banking and financial
systems. Given the relative low level of intermediation in the accession
countries as well as the limited range of financial services currently provided
by the financial sector, the integration in the EU markets will be inevitably
associated with a further expansion of banks’ balance sheets and loan
portfolios. EU accession will increase the competition not only within the
banking sector, but also through the pressure of increased provision of
services from non-bank financial institutions; this may induce banks to take
excessive risks and expand further in the new activities and markets in an
attempt to survive in a more competitive and complex market place. These
market segments, such as retail loans, SME lending and financial derivatives,
are, however, particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information
rendering the risk assessment from banks more difficult. Indeed, higher risk-
taking behaviour by financial institutions in EU accession countries, has
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3 One recent example of such transactions is provided by Hungary. At the beginning of this
year, despite a series of poor economic data, significant speculative portfolio inflows were
recorded based on an anticipated revaluation of the currency. Portfolio and other investments
flows jumped to a net inflow of Euro 4.7 billion in January 2003 from Euro 0.7 billion in
December 2002. It required very heavy central bank intervention on the foreign exchange market
coupled with interest rate cuts and unorthodox administrative measures to successfully fend off
the attack.already been recorded as blue chip corporate clients are increasingly
borrowing directly from international markets.
3.3 The agenda for financial stability
In view of the potential increase in the threats to financial stability, the new
EU members face the challenge to continue to strengthen their financial
systems. Conceptually, the agenda to achieve this objective is relatively
simple. On the level of individual intermediaries, the key issue is to
strengthen and improve the ability to identify and effectively manage risks
incurred in their activity: i.e. credit, interest, foreign exchange and operational
risks. The presence of foreign intermediaries can be of help in this respect, but
the rapid pace of financial innovation in fully integrated capital markets poses
a challenge to every market participant to continuously reassess the adequacy
of its own capital and risk management techniques.
On the level of financial authorities, the top priority is to strengthen prudential
supervision techniques and procedures in order to prevent the emergence of
crisis situations or to manage them in such a way as to forestall systemic
repercussions. There again, the presence of foreign intermediaries may appear
to facilitate the tasks of the local authorities. But, in fact, it requires increased
cooperation with the home country authorities, and does not lessen the risk of
repercussions on the domestically-owned banks, should a foreign-owned
bank become insolvent.
From a structural point of view, it is also important that the authorities
promote the development of a deep and mature non-bank financial sector. The
level of development and the structure of the financial sector are important
sources of strength in the presence of more intense competitive pressures and
more volatile cross-border capital flows. By providing risk-sharing
opportunities and a range of instruments to manage financial risks, a deep and
mature financial market can play an important role in safeguarding financial
stability. Well-developed capital markets can also help to fill the funding gap
and dampen the destructive impact of a banking crisis on the real economy.
At the same time, effective legal and institutional arrangements must be
strengthened with a focus on improving the implementation of the legal
framework, especially with regard to effective bankruptcy laws and
procedures of recovery of collateral. Further improvement in corporate
governance, in both financial and enterprise sectors, is essential for ensuring
financial sector soundness.
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The analysis conducted so far points to the need for strengthening banking
and financial sectors in the accession countries as a prerequisite for financial
stability. In my view this is a necessary condition, but may not be a sufficient
one, not only for the accession countries, but also in general terms. As
indicated in Section 2, in the present configuration of the international
monetary and financial system, with freely floating exchange rates and full
capital mobility, there is the risk that situations of financial instability may
materialise even in countries with sound financial systems in connection with
excessive credit expansion induced by international capital flows. This could
result in significant departures from equilibrium levels of crucial variables
like the exchange rate, the money supply, the price-earning ratio on stocks, or
property prices. In turn, in such circumstances the likelihood of overshootings
and bandwagon increases, with the risk of generating a speculative bubble.
Moreover, the capacity of financial markets to exert discipline on
intermediaries and borrowers has been generally inadequate and the
“disciplinary” actions imparted have often turned out to be “too much, too
late”.
In these circumstances financial instability could have systemic implications,
in the sense that might result in the illiquidity of markets, in the interruption
of normal financing and borrowing operations and in the bankruptcy of
a large number of intermediaries.
If having a sound and well managed financial system is no guarantee for
financial stability, then, what are the policy options available to the monetary
and financial authorities of individual countries to counter emerging financial
imbalances at an early stage? Until recently the answer to this question
coming from both academic economists and policy-makers was rather
disappointing, for a variety of reasons. Abroad consensus supported the thesis
that monetary policy cannot be used to pursue financial stability as it is
already assigned to pursue price stability: if you have two objectives, you
need two instruments. This view has received strong support by such an
authority in the field as Alan Greenspan (2002), who has recently reiterated
the arguments against the recourse to interest rate hikes to counter the
formation of bubbles. Rather – Greenspan maintains – monetary policy
should be used promptly and aggressively to limit the deflationary impact of
the bursting of the bubble, after it has occurred.
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stability, it is widely recognised that the instruments available to the
regulatory authorities of financial markets are not really suitable to cope with
the situations of systemic instability such as those generated by excessive
credit creation. Typically these authorities are equipped to deal with the
instability of individual market participants, be they banks or other financial
intermediaries, and their primary concern is to ensure that market participants
have a capital base adequate with respect to the risks they incur and that their
operations are transparent. The approach followed by supervisory authorities
is, in other words, “microprudential” while the problem they have to deal with
is of a “macroprudential” nature.
In these circumstances, one would have to conclude that there is not much
that the authorities can do to prevent systemic financial instability or the
emergence of bubbles. To take such a resigned attitude, however, could be
seriously counterproductive, as it might convince citizens and their elected
representatives that the only way to cope with financial instability is to
introduce restrictions to capital movements or to “throw sand in the wheels”
of international financial markets. Protectionism is not a viable strategy to
deal with international financial instability, as it would distort the flow of
international trade and investment with negative repercussions for growth and
employment on a global scale. Fortunately, the importance of devising
a policy framework that would allow the normal operation of global financial
markets while promoting conditions of financial stability is being
increasingly recognised, mostly within the central banking community.
A first call for a thorough re-examination of the issues raised for monetary
authorities by financial instability came from Andrew Crockett with his
seminal paper for the 22
nd SUERF Colloquium (Crockett, 2000), in which he
identified two areas for further research and analysis: firstly, how to deal with
the systemic risks associated with the financial cycle; and secondly, the
relationship between monetary and financial stability. This latter question,
Crockett advised, should be explored with a “critical but open mind”. Not
surprisingly, Crockett’s suggestion has been heeded primarily within the BIS,
where a number of very stimulating papers have been produced by Claudio
Borio and his associates. In a first paper (Borio and Lowe, 2002), empirical
evidence is presented that it is possible to identify ex ante financial
imbalances and that sustained credit growth, combined with large upward
movements in asset prices, increases the probability of an episode of financial
instability. The paper also argues that while low inflation promotes financial
stability, it also increases the likelihood that excess demand pressures show
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prices. In subsequent papers (Borio, 2002 and Borio, English and Filardo,
2002) the policy implications of these empirical findings are analysed. As
regards the framework for monetary policy, it is argued that no change would
be required in the objectives of monetary policy, but in the way they are
pursued: basically, greater weight should be given “to signs of the build up of
financial imbalances in deciding when and how far to tighten policy”. As
regards the framework for financial supervision and regulation, it is argued
that a macro-prudential approach would be required in which the main
concern would be “the disruption of economic life [...] brought about by
generalised financial distress” rather than “the pursuit of narrowly interpreted
depositor protection objectives”. In practice, the macro-prudential approach
would rely to a large extent on the cooperation among central banks and
supervisory authorities.
Similar conclusions are reached by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2002) of the
ECB in a recent paper in which he looks for the “the land in between”
monetary policy and prudential supervision; he discovers that that land indeed
does exist and that in it there are instruments that can be used to pursue
financial stability at the system’s level: management of the payments system,
emergency liquidity support, crisis management coordination, public and
private comments (sometimes defined by market participants as “oral
interventions”). As these instruments are available to central banks or to
supervisory authorities or to both, it follows that their efficient use depends
crucially on the coordination of interventions by the authorities involved.
I have briefly summarised these analytical contributions simply to underline
the point that the pursuit of financial stability requires indeed going beyond
the purely structural reforms necessary to strengthen the foundations of the
banking and financial sectors. No doubt further analytical work would be
required to identify the appropriate policy stance to tackle at an early stage
emerging threats to financial stability. I would venture, however, to make
a few general comments of a preliminary nature.
Irrespective of the precise content of the strategy, it is quite likely that
a certain degree of policy activism would be required on the part of monetary
and financial authorities. In a regime of global finance, there are no
“automatic pilot” devices in the framework for monetary and exchange rate
policies or in the prudential regulatory system to which one can safely
relinquish the responsibility of ensuring financial stability. Nor is it advisable
to adopt a policy of benign neglect and rely on market discipline. Policy
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policy at every sign of turbulence; it means to be ready to broadcast
appropriate policy signals whenever there appear to be evidence of
unsustainable trends in relevant financial variables such as credit aggregates,
asset prices, exchange rates. The “signal” should make clear to market
participants that the authorities consider current trends as unsustainable and
likely to lead to severe financial imbalances. The nature of the signal may be
appropriately differentiated in light of circumstances: it may take the form of
an oral warning, or might involve monetary policy measures, exchange
market interventions, tax or regulatory changes.
It may be argued that such policy activism may be in itself destabilising and
give rise to greater market volatility. Moreover, if the activism included
a pre-emptive monetary tightening by the central bank, without clear evidence
of an inflationary threat, this may be criticised as damaging to the economy
and the legitimate interests of, say, private investors in the stock market.
These arguments are understandable, but are not really convincing. Any
policy action is bound to change financial market expectations and the
evaluation of risks and return by intermediaries and investors. The volatility
in financial markets that normally accompanies policy changes reflects
precisely the adjustment process carried out by the market as intermediaries
re-arrange their positions in light of the new expectations about risks and
return on their investment. In this process, inevitably, some people gain and
some people lose. But what it important is that the volatility implies an
enhanced perception of risk by market participants, which may be the crucial
ingredient for deflating a potential financial bubble. Indeed bubbles are
generated when markets lose the perception of a two-way risk; it is one-way
markets that generate overshootings, bandwagons and bubbles.
Thus, in my view, the key question is not if policy activism is justifiable or
not; the key question is whether a potential financial imbalance can be safely
identified at an early stage. Here again, I would tend to discount the usual
arguments that monetary authorities are not endowed with perfect foresight,
that they should not presume to know better than the collective wisdom of
millions of market participants, etc. What is required in this case is not the
crystal ball, but a considerate judgement on the sustainability of economic
trends that are relevant for financial stability. I believe that economic theory,
empirical analysis of historical data, careful monitoring of market dynamics
and plain common sense are in most cases quite sufficient for passing such
a judgement. In fact, the experience gained in the management of
unsustainable trends in exchange rates shows that when the authorities have
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been explicit in advocating a reversal of the trend and have supported their
words with consistent policy actions, the market sentiment has generally
turned around, in many cases quite rapidly.
In a regime of globalisation, however, it may be difficult for the monetary
authorities of any individual country, large or small, to have all the
information needed to assess the impact on financial conditions of
international capital flows and of the operation of global financial markets. It
is only in the fora of international consultation and cooperation that the full
picture of the trends and the vulnerabilities of the international financial
system can be seen. Indeed, also at the international level, there is a need for
reconsidering how best to implement a macro-prudential approach to
financial instability, bringing together the expertise of national finance
ministries, central banks and supervisory agencies. Steps in this direction
have been made in the EU with the reform of the architecture of financial
supervision advocated by the Lamfalussy Committee report; on a broader
international scale, the creation of the Financial Stability Forum has allowed
the development of important synergies of analysis and in the policy debate.
Still, more formal and explicit procedures could be devised to link the review
of macroeconomic policies, with the analysis of financial market trends and
of financial vulnerabilities. A more central role could be envisaged in these
procedures for international institutions like the IMF and the BIS, who have
accumulated an invaluable expertise in the identification of unsustainable
financial trends. To call for strengthened international cooperation in this
tense moment for international relations may sound naïve and unrealistic, but
the fact remains that international financial stability is a public good that can
only be produced by international institutions.
In conclusion, securing financial stability in a globalised international
economy is going to be quite challenging for national monetary authorities
and for the institutions of international cooperation.
As a former central banker, I think the chances of success will depend
crucially on the role that central banking will be allowed to play in this
difficult game. To confine central banks in the role of guardians of price
stability, without fully using their expertise in dealing with banking systems
and financial markets would be a serious misallocation of resources. At the
same time central bankers should not be overcautious and refrain from giving
stability-oriented policy signals to the markets for fear of criticism. As a great
American central banker, William McChesney Martin, famously said, “The
central banker is the guy that takes away the punch bowl when the party getsgoing”. And I cannot forget that Guido Carli, Governor of the Bank of Italy
when I joined it in the mid 1960’s, had wanted in his office a large painting
of Saint Sebastian, looking calm and determined, despite being pierced by
several painful arrows. The painting is still there.
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In this paper, we analyse the link between financial integration and the
stability of financial markets in CEECs that arises through the diversification
of national liquidity shocks. We focus in particular on the form of entry that
foreign financial institutions choose. We distinguish cross-border lending
from FDI in financial services. We extend the model by Allen and Gale (2000)
in two ways. Our first extension acknowledges the fact that CEECs are
financially integrated mainly with EU countries. We argue that exposure to
a large neighbouring region is beneficial for CEECs since it allows the
diversification of liquidity risk through the large EU interbank market. Our
second extension to the baseline model addresses the implications of FDI in
banking for financial stability. Our analysis suggests the improved sharing of
liquidity risk as a third reason why FDI in banking can be stabilising.
Keywords: financial integration and stability, transition economies,
foreign direct investment, liquidity shocks
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471 Motivation
Financial integration and the deregulation of foreign bank entry remain hotly
debated issues in many emerging markets, yet they are often also
controversial in developed market economies.
1 One concern often voiced is
that growing cross-border flows of capital might increase the vulnerability of
countries to exogenous shocks. Common lender effects, i.e. an exposure to
large foreign counterparts, are one channel through which these contagion
effects can emerge (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2000). Risks of financial
contagion seem particularly relevant for the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEECs). Not only have these countries integrated rapidly into
international capital flows, but their own financial systems might also be
relatively prone to financial crises and to financial shocks from abroad.
In this paper, we analyse the link between financial integration and the
stability of financial markets in CEECs that arises through the diversification
of national liquidity shocks. We focus on the form of entry that foreign
financial institutions choose. We distinguish cross-border lending from FDI in
financial services, with the choice between these two forms of entry being
determined by fixed and variable costs. In order to engage in cross-border
lending, banks do not need to establish a presence in a foreign market. Hence,
they save on the fixed costs of entry. However, without having established
a foreign presence they are also restricted in serving the retail banking market
of the host country because access to local information and to the local
customer base is limited. The relative importance of fixed and variable costs
differs for foreign direct investment (FDI). While FDI involves higher fixed
costs than cross-border lending, it also provides banks with better access to
local lending markets. This holds in particular since FDI in banking mainly
takes place through mergers and acquisitions with local financial institutions.
These trade-offs suggest that cross-border lending and FDI in banking have
different implications for the integration of financial market segments (retail
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1 See, e.g., IMF (2000). As regards the role of foreign banks, Claessens et al. (2001), Clarke
et al. (2001), or Mathieson and Roldo (2001) provide general cross-country evidence, and Crystal
et al. (2001, 2002) or Clarke et al. (2000) provide evidence for Latin America. The Asian
experience is reviewed in Abidin (1986), Lardy (2001), Pigott (1986), and Terrell (1986). Bonin
and Abel (2000), Bonin and Leven (1996), Konopielko (1999), and Wachtel (1995) discuss foreign
entry to the banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, Bonin et al. (1998) or Fries
and Taci (2002) discuss the experience of the transition economies in reforming their banking
systems in general.versus wholesale markets) into global capital flows. At the same time, the
form of entry that foreign banks choose also affects the stability of financial
systems as the diversification of regional liquidity shocks is one motive
behind the international expansion of banks (Allen and Gale, 2000). Through
this channel, international financial integration can have stabilising features.
However, Allen and Gale also show that there are non-linear effects between
financial integration and the risk of financial contagion: if integration is
limited, the risks of financial contagion are limited as well. As the degree of
integration increases, so does the risk of financial contagion. Eventually,
though, in highly integrated financial markets the risk of contagion
diminishes again.
Based on a presentation of the model by Allen and Gale (2000), we present
stylised facts for the transition economies and discuss the implications of
specific features of the integration process for financial stability. Our
empirical analysis shows that CEECs are mainly financially integrated with
EU countries. We argue that exposure to a large neighbouring region is
beneficial for CEECs since it allows the diversification of liquidity risk
through the large EU interbank market. Presently, however, the relatively
small shares of interbanking activities in cross-border lending suggest that
this potential may not yet be fully utilised. Also, exposure to a large region
has the potential downside that a liquidity crisis in the EU could spill over into
CEECs.
In addition, we discuss the implications for financial stability of the
significant foreign direct investment in banking that the transition economies
have received. Essentially, diversification of liquidity risks can be achieved
through cross-border lending and borrowing, and does not necessarily require
FDI in banking. Yet, we argue that the FDI of banks has an additional
stabilising feature since it allows banks in CEECs to draw on the liquidity
buffer of their headquarters abroad. This can be done at lower variable costs
than borrowing on the interbank market. Hence, local liquidity shocks
originating in CEECs would have smaller effects on local banking markets
than in a system with just local banks. This argument is relevant for the
transition economies since they have not only been the destination of foreign
bank loans. Rather, there has been foreign entry into their banking sectors to
quite a significant degree. Incidentally, the transition economies are now
among those emerging markets that have the highest penetration of foreign
banks, and the market shares of foreign financial institutions are decidedly
higher than in the current EU member-countries (Graph 1). This potentially
reduces the risk of financial crises.
Motivation 49Hence, our analysis suggests an additional motive to promote foreign entry
into the financial sector. A priori, one might expect that FDI in banking has
stabilising features for two reasons. Firstly, FDI flows are typically less
volatile than other forms of capital flows such as international portfolio
investments and international bank lending. Secondly, because FDI provides
banks with superior information on host markets and requires a stronger
commitment to servicing the foreign market it may be less destabilising than
other forms of entry. Our analysis suggests the improved sharing of liquidity
risk as a third reason why FDI in banking can be stabilising.
This paper is divided into five main parts. In the following second section, we
review the argument by Allen and Gale (2000) that the international
diversification of banks affects financial stability. In section three, we present
empirical evidence on the globalisation of Eastern Europe’s banking system.
We  focus on regional patterns of integration, the importance of bilateral
financial linkages for the transition economies, and the correlation of liquidity
shocks. The two distinguishing features that emerge from this section are the
high share of foreign bank ownership in CEECs and the dominance of the EU
for cross-border financial linkages. These two stylised facts motivate the
extensions of the baseline model by Allen and Gale that account for
differences in market size and entry through FDI, which are presented in
section four. Section five sets out some conclusions.
50 Motivation2 Liquidity Risk and Financial Integration: The Model
by Allen and Gale
In this section, we review the logic of a recent model by Allen and Gale
(2000) which allows the study of the international diversification of liquidity
shocks. Focusing on the impact of financial integration on liquidity risk is
interesting for two reasons. Firstly, one main beneficial effect of international
financial integration comes through the possibility to diversify risks.
Secondly, recent models of the banking firm stress the role of banks as
providers of liquidity services (Hellwig, 1998, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein,
2002).
Allen and Gale (2000) show that regional liquidity shocks can have spillover
effects for other markets. The model focuses on the interaction between the
regional diversification of banks’ portfolios and regional liquidity shocks. It
assumes that all countries or regions have the same currency, i.e. exchange
rate risk does not exist. The model’s main message is that international
portfolio diversification allows banks to better diversify risks but, at the same
time, also exposes them to the spillover of foreign shocks. In addition, the link
between financial integration and the transmission of shocks might be
non-linear.
Allen and Gale (2000) consider a model with four regions (A, B, C, D), each
being home to a number of identical banks. Hence, one representative bank in
each market is studied. Banks have the option to invest in short and long-term
domestic loans. They do not grant loans to non-bank customers abroad, but
there is a network of interregional interbank assets and liabilities since each
bank can hold interbank deposits abroad. The balance sheet of
a representative bank in region A, for instance, looks as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Domestic long-term assets Domestic deposits from non-banks
Domestic short-term assets
Interbank deposits with banks  Interbank deposits from banks in 
in regions B, C, and/or D regions B, C, and/or D
51The role of the banks is to make investments on behalf of their customers and
provide them with liquidity. Customers in each region are assumed to be
identical ex ante, and they are each endowed with one unit of a consumption
good in t=0 . However, they are split into two groups regarding their
consumption preferences. One fraction (ω ) prefers to consume early (in t=1 ),
the other fraction (1-ω ) consumes late (in t=2 ). When banks decide about
their investments in long-term and short-term assets in t=0the individual
consumption pattern of each customer is not known, neither to the customer
nor the bank. The customer’s stochastic liquidity needs may differ according
to the state of nature S. The state S is revealed only after investment decisions
have been made. The preferences of a representative consumer are given by:
Hence, with probability ω (1-ω ), they are early (late) consumers. These shares
of early and late consumers differ across markets and states of nature S. The
probability of being an early consumer in a market can be high (ω H) or low
(ω L), with 0<ω L < ω H <1 . Agents have complete information about their
environment. There are no asymmetries in information, and all investment
decisions – including the allocation of interbank deposits – must be made
before the actual state of nature is revealed.
Consumers can deposit their endowments with one of the regional banks.
Banks can invest in short-term domestic assets, which yield a return of one in
t = 1 or into a long-term domestic asset which yields R > 1 in t = 2 or r if
liquidated prematurely in period one. Banks can hold (interbank) bank
deposits with all or only some of the other regional banks. The time structure
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Short-term investments yield
a return of 1
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a return of R > 1
Late consumers consumeIn t=1the state of the nature S is revealed. Allen and Gale distinguish two
states (S1 and  S2) concerning the distribution of liquidity shocks in their
four-region model (Table 1). All four regions are the same size. Liquidity
shocks in regions A and C (B and D) are perfectly positively correlated, but
are perfectly negatively correlated with those in regions B and D (A and C).
Hence, ρ (ω H,ω L)=-1. Note that, since two of the symmetric regions have
a high liquidity preference and two have a low liquidity preference, there is
no aggregate shortage of liquidity in the aggregate. Also, the aggregate
demand for liquidity is the same in each state as half of the regions have
a high (low) demand for liquidity. Ex ante, each region has the same
probability of having high (low) demand for liquidity.
2.1 Optimal Risk-sharing
As long as there is no aggregate liquidity shortage, optimal risk-sharing can
be assured by a central planner or by a decentralised solution of banks using
the interbank market to shield themselves against regional liquidity shocks.
This optimal risk-sharing solution can be implemented by a central planner
and will be taken as a benchmark in the discussion below. The central planner
maximises the unweighted sum of consumers’ expected utilities since
consumers are identical ex ante. All early consumers receive c1 and all late
consumers receive c2, independent of the state of nature. The planner chooses
a portfolio (x,y) ≥ 0 which satisfies the feasibility constraint:
(1) x + y ≤ 1,
where  x and  y denote the per capita amounts invested in long-term and
short-term assets, respectively, and 1 is the total endowment per person. It is
optimal to provide consumption in the first period by holding short-term
assets and in the second by holding long-term assets. As the average fraction
of early consumers is given by γ =( ω H+ω L)/2, the feasibility constraint at date
1 is:
(2) γ c1 ≤ y,
and the feasibility constraint at date 2 is:
(3) (1 - γ )c2 ≤ Rx.
Prior to making investments, consumers do not know which type they are,
and the expected ex ante utility at date 0 is
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Maximising the expected ex ante utility at date 0 under these feasibility
constraints gives the first-best allocation of financial assets as u’(c1)≥u’(c2).
Otherwise, utility can be increased by using the short-term asset to shift
consumption from early to late consumers. This first-best allocation also
satisfies the incentive constraint:
(5) c1 ≤c 2,
i.e. late consumers find it weakly optimal to reveal their true type. Notice that
c1 >c 2 is not a feasible outcome since the storage technology would allow late
consumers to increase their consumption by mimicking early consumers,
retrieving deposits in the first period, and storing their return until the second
period. Hence, the incentive-efficient allocation of assets needs to maximise
the objective function (4) subject to the feasibility constraints (1), (2), and (3)
and the incentive constraint (5). The incentive-efficient allocation is also the
first-best allocation. Thus, the first-best allocation can be achieved even if the
planner cannot observe consumer types.
2.2 Decentralised Solutions
Optimal risk-sharing may not be obtained in a decentralised market without
an interbank market. In this situation, the representative bank in each region
invests in a portfolio (x
i,y
i)≥0and offers a deposit contract (c1
i,c2
i). However,
the bank cannot offer the same payments as the central planner. While x+y≤1
would meet its budget constraint at date 0, the short-term investment of y does
not equal the liquidity needs in t=1since these are stochastic and unknown
at t=0 . In contrast to the central planner, the bank cannot average over
regions, and liquidity needs in each region must be met by using the deposits
of this region only. Although there is no aggregate shortage of liquidity,
liquidity is inefficiently distributed. A bank located in a region with
a high-liquidity need, for instance, faces withdrawals of deposits of ω H > γ in
the first period. Since the liquidation value of the long-term asset is low, the
bank might not be able to satisfy this demand for deposits. The opposite
would hold in a region with low liquidity needs in the first period.
A first-best allocation of resources can be achieved though through interbank
deposit holdings. Assume that financial markets are completely integrated
and that banks are allowed to exchange their deposits at date 0 (Case 1 in
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every bank i needs to hold z
i=(ω H-γ )/2>0in every other region. Because of
the complete uncertainty that prevails at date 0, banks will hold interbank
deposits in all of the three other regions. This yields a first-best allocation of
financial resources if banks ‘swap’ liquidity from regions with low liquidity
needs with those with high liquidity needs in t = 1 (and vice versa in t = 2).
Essentially, the interbank market helps to average out liquidity needs just like
the central planner would do. By swapping liquidity needs through interbank
deposit holdings, it is thus possible that: (i) banks satisfy their budget
constraints in each period; and (ii) consumers achieve first-best consumption
levels.
Interestingly, for the interbank market to perform its role of distributing
liquidity efficiently complete financial integration is not required. Essentially,
the issue is whether there are bilateral financial linkages between all regions
or whether some regions are financially isolated from others. Three cases
need to be distinguished (Graph 2). Financial markets are completely
integrated if all bilateral linkages exist (Case 1). Due to transaction and
information costs, some regional financial markets may not be connected at
all. This may lead to incomplete financial integration (Case 2), in which all
markets are linked, albeit only indirectly in some cases. There may also be
a disconnected market structure in which markets create clusters of
integration but these regional clusters are not interlinked (Case 3).
Allen and Gale show that the first-best allocation of resources can also be
achieved when financial markets are only incompletely integrated (Cases 2
and 3). The only condition that needs to be met is that regions with high and
low liquidity needs are not completely disconnected. Thus, financial
integration has positive welfare implications because it allows banks and
consumers to average out stochastic regional liquidity needs. Hence, the
degree of integration does not affect optimal investment and consumption
patterns. However, it has very different effects on the fragility of the financial
system, to which we now turn.
2.3 Excess Liquidity Shocks and Financial Fragility
An interbank market achieves a first-best allocation of liquidity only as long
as there is no aggregate shortage of liquidity. If aggregate demand for
liquidity is greater than the system’s ability to supply liquidity, the existence
of an (interregional) interbank market does not suffice to prevent liquidity
crises.
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denote the state in which region A might be hit by an
excess liquidity shock which puts total liquidity needs above the average
liquidity needs γ =( ω H+ω L)/2. More precisely, let all regions have the
previous average demand for liquidity γ , except for region A which has
slightly higher demand γ +ε . In this case, banks in region A have to liquidate
part of their long-term assets at the lower rate of return r (r<1<R ) in order
to meet their depositors’ liquidity needs in t = 1. Their short-term assets plus
interbank deposits held in other regions are not enough to meet the liquidity
demand in t=1 . The bank is thus illiquid.
The bank can at most liquidate that fraction of long-term assets that leaves
late consumers with c1 at date 2, since late consumers would otherwise
withdraw their deposits in t=1and store them. Thus, a bank with a fraction
ω of early consumers must at least keep (1-ω )c1/R units of long-term assets to
be able to pay out late consumers at t=2 . The bank therefore has a buffer of
long-term assets which it can liquidate without triggering a bank run of
b(ω ) ≡ r[x-(1-ω )c1/R]. If the excess liquidity shock ε is larger than the buffer
(6) ε c1 ≥ b(γ + ε ),
the bank in region A cannot avoid a bank run without the help of banks from
other regions. In this case, the bank is insolvent. The liquidation value q
A (all
depositors being treated equally) is given by the following ratio of assets and
liabilities:





where qi denotes the liquidation value of deposits in region i, and z are the
deposits held in adjacent regions. While q
B might equal c1, q
A is definitely
smaller. Yet, q
B being smaller than c1 indicates the insolvency of bank B. This
bank is unable to meet all liquidity needs in t=1 either. The reason is that its
liquidity buffer b(ω ) is smaller than the losses due to the devalued deposits
held in bank A (the liquidation value q
B includes q
A). Then, the liquidity crisis
in one region becomes contagious, and the liquidity shock spills over into
region B.
The probability that the illiquidity and insolvency of banks spill over into
other regions depends on the pattern of financial integration (Graph 2). In the
case of financial autarky the excess liquidity shock affects region A only.
A similar result would occur in the case of disconnected financial markets
(Case 3) as the liquidity shocks would be contained in two regions (A and B).
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however, the shock first spills over into region D. If in this region the
spillover effect is also large relative to bank D’s buffer, a bank run would
occur as well and this effect would make its way through all the remaining
regional markets. Hence, under these assumptions (the shock being large
relative to the liquidity buffers in regions A and D) it can be shown that
a non-zero probability of state S
–
would result in the complete contagion of
financial shocks (see Allen and Gale, 2000). In completely integrated
financial markets (Case 1), there is a lower likelihood of financial contagion
because the initial excess liquidity shock is distributed over more regions, and
each region is hit by a relatively small shock only. Thus, it is less likely that
the shock would exceed the liquidity buffer in each region.
Hence, there is a non-monotonic relationship between financial integration
and the probability of contagion. As regions move from complete financial
isolation to greater but yet incomplete integration, the risk of financial
contagion increases. The risk falls again, however, as markets tend towards
full integration because greater integration implies greater insurance against
regional liquidity shocks. As in standard portfolio models, the benefits of
diversification increase as the number of regions held in the portfolio of banks
increases and as the correlation between liquidity shocks differs among
regions.
While the model by Allen and Gale was not developed with CEECs in mind,
it still can be used to derive implications for the link between financial
integration and financial stability in these countries. More specifically, this
section has shown that financial integration can be beneficial for CEECs
because it allows them to diversify stochastic liquidity shocks. The extent to
which these benefits materialise depends on three factors: (i) the regional
structure of financial integration; (ii) the correlation of liquidity shocks
between regions; and (iii) the depth of integration. Hence, the following
section presents stylised facts on the integration process of CEECs.
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Evidence from CEECs
The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have become
integrated into international capital markets at an impressive speed over the
past decade. The market shares of foreign banks are far above the averages
for the typical EU country, cross-border capital flows have grown, and the
countries rely on international bank lending to a substantial degree.
Apart from the beneficial effects of this integration process for investment
and economic growth, increased financial integration may, as the above
discussion has shown, affect the stability of banking systems in CEECs.
Below, we present a number of indicators which assess the potential impact
of foreign banking on the stability of banking systems in the transition
economies. First of all, we study the regional pattern of cross-border bank
lending and FDI. We then ask how important bilateral financial linkages for
the countries under study are, by looking at the ratio between cross-border
lending and domestic credit. Finally, we look at the significance of the
interbank market and the correlation of liquidity shocks between Eastern and
Western Europe.
3.1 The Regional Structure of International Banking
If the diversification of liquidity shocks was a primary motive behind the
international expansion of banks, regional proximity should play a relatively
limited role in explaining international lending patterns. However, a large
body of empirical evidence has shown that geographical distance does help to
explain international asset-allocation decisions. This can be taken as evidence
that banks are not fully diversified internationally and that, therefore,
according to the above theoretical framework, regional liquidity shocks might
spill over into nearby regions. In the following section, we essentially confirm
the importance of regional lending and FDI patterns for CEECs.
3.1.1 Cross-border Lending and Borrowing
Table 3 gives a regional breakdown of the foreign assets of BIS-reporting
banks. It is based on data on the aggregated claims of banks on all borrowers
in a given recipient country. Regional patterns in cross-border lending are
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important lenders to CEECs. Lending by German and Austrian banks, for
instance, has above-average importance for CEECs in general, with a clear
focus on neighbouring countries like Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovak Republic, or Slovenia. There is also a clear tendency of Scandinavian
banks to lend to the Baltic countries. The Baltic countries receive, for
instance, 86.3% of all Finnish, and 91.8% of Swedish lending to CEECs.
Sweden and Finland are also the source of 85.4% of Estonian, 77% of
Latvian, and 59.8% of Lithuanian cross-border borrowing. The concentration
of French and Dutch lending on Romania, however, contradicts regional
lending patterns.
The diversification of local liquidity needs requires not only imports but also
exports of financial funds. However, the BIS, from whom the data underlying
Table 3 has been obtained, does not provide a regional breakdown of the
foreign assets of CEECs. Hence, we do not know how important the asset
holdings of CEECs in the EU are. Moreover, we do not know to what extent
banks hold assets in international interbank markets. However, aggregated
data on the foreign assets and liabilities of banks in CEECs tell us that banks
do indeed hold quite large foreign assets. To the extent that these assets are
invested in international interbank markets, they contribute to the
diversification of liquidity shocks.
3.1.2 Cross-border Borrowing versus Domestic Credit
Table 3 shows that lending to CEECs is relatively unimportant from the point
of view of Western European countries. Yet, the reverse does not hold true.
Rather, countries like Austria, Germany, Finland or Sweden are important
lenders in Eastern Europe. This potentially enhances the transition countries’
exposure to liquidity shocks originating in these countries.
Table 4 compares the cross-border assets of BIS-reporting banks to domestic
credit in the EU countries and in CEECs. These data are not fully comparable
for two reasons. First, cross-border banking assets comprise cross-border
claims and local claims in foreign currency. Thus, to the extent that foreign
currency loans are important, cross-border lending is biased upward. Second,
cross-border assets comprise cross-border lending as well as FDI and
portfolio investment. Again, this biases our measure of cross-border lending
upward.
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cross-border finance of CEECs. Whereas cross-border foreign assets are
47.5% relative to domestic credit in the EU countries, they reach a similar
order of magnitude as domestic credit in CEECs. (However, they are less
important relative to GDP because of the smaller relative size of Eastern
Europe’s banking system). Moreover, the bulk of this foreign lending (about
three-quarters) originates in EU countries.
Although, for the current EU members, international liabilities are likewise
concentrated in the EU, bilateral financial linkages are quite unimportant
relative to the total size of their financial markets. Comparing the
cross-border assets of German commercial banks to domestic credit in the EU
countries shows that most bilateral financial linkages are only a relatively
small fraction of total domestic credit. The most important cross-border
linkages are German banks’ assets in the relatively small economies of
Luxembourg and Austria with 45.8% and 37.5% of domestic claims,
respectively. Cross-border asset holdings of German commercial banks also
achieve shares of 10 percent or more of domestic credit in a number of EU
countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands,
United Kingdom).
The picture looks quite different for CEECs. Here, some countries have
relatively significant bilateral exposures to EU countries. German banks’
foreign assets, for instance, account for 22% – 46% of domestic credit in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, or Slovenia. Finnish banks have
assets in Estonia and Latvia that represent 22% of the domestic credit market.
Similarly, all Baltic countries have quite a significant exposure to Swedish
banks’foreign assets. Interestingly, there are also some quite strong financial
linkages between Belgium and the Czech Republic.
3.1.3 FDI in Banking
The above data have shown that CEECs not only have relatively large shares
of cross-border liabilities, but that these liabilities are also heavily
concentrated in Western European countries. Some bilateral financial linkages
are particularly close. This might be taken as evidence of the high risk of
financial contagion. Yet, as will be explored in more detail in Section 4 below,
the foreign ownership of banks could limit the risk of contagion. This is
because foreign direct investment creates an international intrabank market for
liquidity which makes it easier for banks to absorb liquidity shocks.
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more patchy than the data on the regional pattern of cross-border banking
assets as a whole. Hence, we primarily draw on two main data sources.
First, the Deutsche Bundesbank, which publishes data on the stocks of FDI of
German banks abroad. For reasons of data protection, such information is
available for a significantly smaller number of countries than data on total
FDI. For the stock of FDI of banks abroad in 2000, data are available for 20
countries. Regionally disaggregated FDI data of the financial sector are also
available from the Austrian National Bank. In its annual FDI survey, data are
given for four country groups (EU-15, NAFTA, OECD, and CEEC-5). The
CEEC-5 includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic,
and Slovenia. Furthermore, data on the 10 main partner countries of Austrian
companies are given, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
Second, since mergers and acquisitions are an important channel through
which FDI in the banking industry occurs we use information on cross-border
mergers that were announced and completed between 1985 and 2001 where
at least one of the partners was a commercial bank and the other partner was
any type of firm. Usually, the other partner was in financial services, that is
to say, commercial banking, securities, or insurance. We define a cross-border
merger as any merger where the headquarters of the target are not located in
the same country as the ultimate parent of the acquirer. For example, when the
US subsidiary of a German bank acquires a US bank, the deal is considered
to be cross-border. We only include completed mergers. We obtained the
names of merger partners from Thomson Financial Securities Data, which
relies on more than 200 news sources, regulatory filings, trade publications as
well as surveys of investment banks, law firms and other advisors to create its
database. The database includes international mergers and acquisitions
starting in 1985. Up to 1992, the database includes all deals with a value of at
least USD 1 million and, after 1992, deals of any value are covered. Also
included are transactions with undisclosed values as well as public and
private transactions.
The extent of German and Austrian FDI in the financial sector in the EU and
in CEECs is shown in Table 6. These two countries were responsible for about
one-half of FDI inflows into CEECs in the 1990s (European Integration
Consortium, 2001). German financial institutions are strongly integrated into
the world economy in general and into the European economy in particular.
Yet, relative to their deep integration into EU markets, the FDI activities of
German banks in CEECs are relatively modest from the point of view of the
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transition economies. The FDI stocks of German banks are only as high as the
FDI stocks of the much smaller Austrian banks in CEECs. However,
measured as a share in total inward FDI stocks of the transition countries, the
activities of German banks are quite significant. German banks hold a share
of 15.5%, 40.5% and 23.1% in total inward FDI stocks in the financial sector
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, respectively. Austrian financial
institutions’ share stands at 22.4%, 40.3%, and 8.6%, respectively (Table 7).
Further, Table 6 shows that, for CEECs, FDI in the financial sector is more
important than for EU countries. This is true when the importance of FDI is
measured relative to domestic credit, interbank deposits, or cross-border
claims. Two factors are responsible for this. First, the financial sector was
fairly underdeveloped under the central planning system, and efficiency gains
to be realised have thus potentially been greater than in the EU. Second, the
entry of foreign banks was particularly encouraged through the privatisation
of formerly state-owned banks during the 1990s (see for example Bonin and
Wachtel, 1999).
Mergers and acquisitions are a form of FDI that has been used very
intensively by European financial institutions in CEECs. Table 7 contains the
shares of completed mergers in the financial sector of a CEEC by the country
of the acquiring financial institution. The emerging picture is similar to the
FDI patterns and to those of total claims. German and Austrian financial
institutions have been the most active players in CEECs. In particular, their
shares are very high in their neighbouring countries. German financial
institutions, for instance, account for a third of all purchases of Polish and
Hungarian financial institutions. Austrian financial institutions have been
especially active in the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, with shares in all deals
of 43% and 33%, respectively. The Baltic/Scandinavian cluster is again
apparent, consisting of Sweden, Finland and the three Baltic States. In the
south, the Greek engagement in Romania and Bulgaria is worth noting.
3.2 The Importance of Interbanking Activities
If diversification of liquidity risk was the main factor driving the international
activities of commercial banks, interbank lending and borrowing should be
the main channel through which banks internationalise themselves. We would
also expect a relatively high share of short-term, liquid assets and liabilities.
Retail banking and long-term investment financing, since it usually requires
a physical presence in the host country, would be a much more costly way of
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foreign assets can be taken as an indication of the extent to which the
diversification motive has been behind the expansion of foreign banks into
the transition economies.
When comparing the structure of international bank assets, there are some
striking differences between CEECs and the rest of the sample, in particular
the EU. On average, long-term banking assets accounted for one-half of the
foreign liabilities of CEECs compared to only 23% for the current EU
members in March 2002 (Table 2). This discrepancy is also evident for most
individual CEECs (Table 5). These differences are a mirror-image of the
below-average importance of the interbanking business for CEECs. In
contrast to current EU members, for which interbanking activities constitute
more than one-half of foreign liabilities vis-à-vis banks, the comparable ratio
for CEECs is only 28%. Consequently, long-term lending to the non-bank
private sector is much more important for CEECs.
3.3 Correlation of Liquidity Shocks
Assessing the diversification effects of financial integration requires not only
information about the magnitude of cross-border financial linkages but also
on the magnitude and correlation of liquidity shocks. We have therefore
calculated the volatility in the deposit rates of 13 EU countries and 9 CEECs
as well as the correlation between changes in deposit interest rates between
these two groups of countries. Monthly interest rates are taken from the IMF
(2002) for the period January 1990 to December 2001.
Table 8 shows average deposit rates as well as standard deviations and
coefficients of variations as measures of volatility for the two groups of
countries. As far as the level of interest rates is concerned, deposit rates in
CEECs have – as expected – been above those in the EU. Higher inflation and
greater scarcity of capital can explain these differences. At the same time,
deposit rates in CEECs have also been more volatile than those seen in the
EU. On average, the coefficient of variation for current EU members has only
been one-half of that for CEECs (0.44 versus 0.83). The exceptions are the
Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic, which might partly be
due to the shorter time series that are available. For the Czech and Slovak
republics, data do not cover the – more volatile – early transition period.
Generally, the data show quite significant heterogeneity not only between
CEECs and EU countries, but also within the group of the transition
economies.
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size of liquidity shocks that Table 8 reveals suggests that CEECs could benefit
from integrating with the larger and less volatile markets of Western Europe.
For diversification to be beneficial, however, the correlation of liquidity
shocks between Eastern and Western Europe should also be relatively small.
Therefore, Table 9 shows bilateral correlation coefficients for deposit rates in
the EU and in CEECs. The last two rows of this table show that, on average,
correlations of deposit rates of CEECs with the EU are smaller than those
among the EU countries themselves. Hence, European financial integration
would bring greater diversification benefits to CEECs than to the current EU
members. At the same time, diversification benefits are quite unevenly
distributed across CEECs. While for some, such as the Baltic States, Poland,
and Slovenia, the correlations are fairly high or even above the EU average,
others have low or even negative correlations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovakia). Particularly for this last group of countries, financial
integration can provide a shield against national liquidity shocks.
Interestingly, when studying the correlations of interest rates within the two
groups of countries, the current EU members appear much more homogenous
than CEECs. Within the group of CEECs, correlations between deposit rates
are often negative. In contrast, correlations among EU countries are always
positive, with Ireland and the UK being the main exceptions. One key reason
behind these differences is, of course, that the EU countries have made
substantial efforts to harmonise interest rate developments in the run up to the
euro. The CEECs have, during the same period, gone through quite severe
transition crises and pursued different adjustment policies. In addition, the
greater correlation of interest rate developments within the EU can also be
taken as evidence of the greater financial integration of these countries
compared to CEECs.
In summary, this section has shown that the relatively small financial markets
of CEECs can potentially gain from financial integration with Western
European markets. They are not only exposed to greater liquidity shocks, but
the correlations of liquidity shocks with the EU are also fairly low. Shocks in
EU countries, which might have a substantial effect on CEECs, in contrast,
seem to be rare and small.
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Potentially, the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe could
profit tremendously from financial integration with Western European
financial markets because the correlations of liquidity shocks between the two
regions are relatively low. Since liquidity shocks in Western Europe are
relatively small and can, moreover, be cushioned through a well-established
EU-wide and global capital market, the risk of financial contagion might also
appear relatively limited.
However, at least two peculiarities need to be taken into account when
discussing the welfare implications of financial integration between Eastern
and Western Europe. The first of these is the large difference between the size
of these two regions. The aggregated GDP of CEECs accounts for less than
10% of the GDP of an enlarged Europe. Differences in the size of financial
markets are of a similar order of magnitude (on differences in the size and
structure of financial markets in Eastern and Western Europe, see for example
Thimann, 2002, Reininger et al., 2002, Rieß et al., 2002, or Wagner and
Iakova, 2001). This might raise the concern that financial shocks originating
in Western Europe could have adverse effects on Eastern financial markets.
The second feature of accession states are the relatively large market shares
of foreign banks that these countries have attracted. In contrast to the effects
of differences in market size, large FDI in the financial services sector can be
expected to stabilise rather than destabilise the financial system in CEECs.
In the remainder of this section we discuss how and through which channels
country size and the form of entry of foreign banks affect the link between
financial integration and the risk of contagion.
4.1 The Impact of Size
Although the model in Section 2 assumed the four regions are equal in size,
another underlying implication is that exposure to a relatively large region
does matter. Integrating with larger markets particularly enables banks from
smaller regions to diversify consumers’stochastic liquidity needs. In contrast,
larger regions such as the EU cannot shield themselves by integrating with
65a smaller region. Instead, they must integrate with regions of a similar size in
order to ensure that sufficient liquidity is available.
More specifically, it has been shown in the analysis of equally sized regions
in Section 2 that a first-best allocation of assets can be achieved
independently of the degree of integration. That does not apply to regions
which differ in size. Let us assume that there are only two regions, which are
large (EU) and small (CEECs). Even if we do not assume that an excess
liquidity shock occurs, an optimal allocation of interbank assets and liabilities
cannot be achieved because the liquidity buffer that banks from the large
region can hold in the small region would be insufficient to meet the liquidity
needs of early consumers in the large region.
In contrast to the scenario involving regions of the same size, averaging over
all consumers in both regions does not give the optimal investment in long-
term and short-term assets by a representative bank in one of the two regions
since the aggregate liquidity requirements differ in both periods depending on
the state. For investment to be optimal, the distribution of early and late
consumers in both regions would have to be known ex ante. An interbank
market does not guarantee a first-best allocation if the regions are
asymmetrical in size and if, therefore, the stochastic effects do not cancel out.
Although the smaller region could shield itself completely against consumers’
stochastic liquidity needs by integrating with the larger region and investing
according to the optimality conditions, the integrated market system cannot
be stable since banks in the large region would lose their resources. Hence,
the large region – the EU – would need to integrate with regions other than
the accession states to ensure the optimal consumption level to its consumers.
Asymmetries in country size not only imply that an optimal allocation of
liquidity can be achieved but also affect the probability that banking crises
become contagious. If an excess liquidity shock hits one region (state S
–
), the
size of this region defines the size of the required liquidity buffer and
therefore the likelihood of spillovers to other regions.
Therefore, the above analysis shows that financial integration between two
regions that differ in size has implications for the optimal allocation of
liquidity and for financial stability. As regards the optimal allocation of
liquidity, integration has beneficial effects for banks in CEECs. For these
countries, integration with the EU interbank market can shield them from
stochastic liquidity needs in their countries. The deposits they swap with EU
66 Financial Integration and Stability: Implications for the Accession Statesbanks are large enough to guarantee a sufficient supply of liquidity, and for
a first-best allocation of financial assets to be achieved. In contrast, EU banks
cannot shield themselves completely against consumers’ stochastic liquidity
needs by swapping deposits only with banks from CEECs. They need to
integrate into larger markets to achieve a first-best allocation.
While integration with the EU is thus beneficial for CEECs in terms of
diversification, it might not be optimal in terms of financial stability. If the EU
is hit by an excess liquidity shock, the risk of contagion is large for CEECs if
EU banks become insolvent because of the large claims that CEECs have in
EU banks relative to the size of CEEC banks (and therefore to their buffer).
However, in developed and liquid markets like the EU’s financial market,
a liquidity shock must be very large to lead to the insolvency of the
‘representative’ bank.
Integration with CEECs can also have effects on banking system stability in
EU countries. If a Central or Eastern European country is hit by a large excess
liquidity shock, the probability of a crisis in this country is high. The financial
system in the country that is hit cannot provide enough liquidity. A banking
crisis might result. The contagion of EU countries is less likely since the
swapped deposits account for only a small part of their global interbank
market claims. Deposits swapped with CEECs are small relative to their
liquidity buffer. In contrast, the risk of contagion of other CEECs is relatively
large if they are integrated with the defaulting country.
4.2 The Impact of FDI
Whereas deeper integration through the interbank market ensures a first-best
allocation of financial assets, it might not always increase the stability of
a financial system. Yet, lending and borrowing through the interbank market
is not the only form of entering a CEEC. FDI in the financial sector of CEECs
from banks and other financial institutions of EU countries also increased
quite rapidly during the 1990s.
In this section, we argue that the quite substantial increase in foreign
ownership of their banking systems that CEECs have been experiencing in
the past decade can be a factor enhancing the stability of the integration
process. This is because a multinational bank, with affiliates in two regions,
can use its liquidity buffers in both regions to help itself in the case of an
excessive liquidity shock. If, for instance, a transition economy is hit by an
excess liquidity shock and if a multinational bank is active through both an
Financial Integration and Stability: Implications for the Accession States 67affiliate in the CEEC and through the parent company in an EU country the
affiliate’s buffer is enlarged by the financial means of the parent bank (for
a similar argument addressing the use of an intra-firm market for liquidity as
a motivation for bank mergers, see Carletti et al., 2001).
Prior to showing the stability-enhancing features of FDI in banking, we must
demonstrate that FDI can also be a way of achieving the optimal asset
allocation. Therefore, we again assume a situation in which no excess
liquidity shock occurs. In this situation, a first-best allocation of financial
assets can either be achieved through FDI or through the interbank market (or
through a combination of both). The difference between FDI and cross-border
lending and borrowing is that FDI generates an intrabank market for liquidity.
Profits are maximised jointly over both markets, which implies that each bank
averages over both regions in the same way as the interbank market or the
central planner do. For a two-region structure with symmetrical regions and
negatively correlated shocks, FDI is thus sufficient to shield against stochastic
liquidity needs.
FDI in banking also increases banking system stability if we allow for the
possibility that aggregate liquidity shortages can occur. In this case, FDI in
banking fails to provide enough liquidity (as does the integration through the
interbank market, or the social planner). However, FDI can offer a more
stable mechanism of risk sharing if the system is under distress. The reason
for this stabilising feature of FDI is that the liquidity buffer of the foreign
headquarters can also be used. The banking system with multinational banks
can thus absorb larger liquidity shocks than a system relying solely on the
interbank market.
68 Financial Integration and Stability: Implications for the Accession States5 Summary
Does foreign entry increase or reduce the stability of banking systems in the
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe? Apart from the effects
that foreign entry has for the efficiency of resource allocation in these
countries, this is perhaps the most pressing policy issue. This is particularly
relevant since the upcoming EU membership of the accession states will
require the tearing down of all remaining barriers to the free flow of capital
and to the market entry of foreign financial institutions.
In this paper, we have employed the theoretical framework by Allen and Gale
(2000) to discuss the financial stability implications of financial integration
for CEECs. The baseline model suggests that financial integration can be
beneficial since it allows a country to better diversify its stochastic liquidity
needs. However, increased financial integration also increases the risk that
foreign financial crises spill over to the home economy, and the link between
financial integration and the risk of contagion may be non-linear. Countries at
intermediate levels of financial development might be particularly prone to
contagion effects since they are already exposed to foreign markets but have
not yet developed a full-fledged system of international financial relations.
Have the countries of Central and Eastern Europe already moved beyond the
point at which further financial integration increases rather than decreases the
risk of financial contagion? The analysis of this paper has shown both positive
and negative developments. On the positive side, the paper has shown that
capital flows have increased significantly over the past decade, which
suggests that the degree of integration is already quite large. Also, integration
is strongest with EU countries which, judged by their low liquidity shocks and
low correlations of shocks with those occurring in CEECs, appear to be quite
‘ideal’ partners. On the negative side, however, the importance of
interbanking activities in cross-border capital flows is still relatively small for
CEECs compared to other industrialised countries. This suggests that access
to international interbank markets is still limited and that further integration
is needed to fully reap the fruits of diversification.
Apart from the degree of integration as such, the paper has also addressed the
question of to what extent the form of entry of foreign banks matters for
stability. This question is particularly relevant for CEECs since they have
experienced the entry of foreign banks on a relatively unprecedented scale.
69We find that FDI in banking does indeed have stabilising features. In contrast
to cross-border lending and borrowing, FDI creates an intrabank market for
liquidity and thus allows affiliates in CEECs to use the liquidity buffers of
their parent banks abroad. Hence, FDI can offer a more stable mechanism of
risk-sharing than cross-border lending and borrowing if the system is under
distress.
If FDI enhances the stability (and thus the sustainability of the integration
process), how can countries promote FDI? The answer to this question lies
beyond the scope of this paper. Explaining FDI in banking would require
a richer model than the one used here. Necessary ingredients for such a model
would be modelling of the retail banking market and of the fixed costs of
entry. Although being preferable to integration solely through the interbank
market concerning the stability of the financial system, FDI is more costly
from the point of view of the foreign bank. Also, the improved diversification
of liquidity shocks is an externality that an individual bank would not
necessarily take into account. Hence, increased financial stability would be
a positive by-product of promoting the entry of foreign banks through, for
instance, privatisation programmes.
With regard to the empirical work presented in this paper, the analysis has
revealed some striking and potentially interesting differences between CEECs
and the current EU members. This applies in particular to the proxies of
liquidity shocks that we have presented. Of course, these calculations should
be taken as a fairly rough indicator of liquidity shocks since correlations of
interest rates are strongly influenced by factors that we do not take into
account here. The choice of exchange rate regime is one obvious variable that
future work should control for.
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0Graph 2 – Financial Integration versus Connectedness
Case 1 – Complete Financial Integration
Case 2 – Incomplete Financial Integration
Case 3 – Disconnected Financial Markets
Source: Allen and Gale (2000)
75Table 1 – Regional Liquidity Shocks
Source: Allen and Gale (2000).
Table 2 – Structure of Cross-Border Bank Claims (March 2002)
Source: BIS (2002), authors’ calculations.
76
State of nature A B C D
S1 ω H ω L ω H ω L
S2 ω L ω H ω L ω H
Maturity Sector
% of international  Total Non-bank
claims international Short-term Long-term Banks Public private
claims sector sector
EU-15 52.5 57.0 23.2 52.3 13.4 32.6
CEEC-10 1.0 35.8 48.7 27.7 20.5 50.9
Japan 4.0 53.9 10.7 63.4 7.0 22.9
United States 16.2 41.8 33.8 28.2 12.2 58.4
Asia and Pacific 3.2 48.0 37.3 34.2 14.7 49.4
Latin Am., Caribbean 3.1 46.5 45.6 16.3 17.6 65.7
Offshore centres 8.3 45.3 35.8 32.4 1.0 65.8
Africa + Middle East 1.4 50.4 44.0 34.6 16.4 48.9



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF (2002), authors’ calculations.
Levels Standard Deviation Mean Coefficient
in Interest Rates of Variation
Austria 0.71 2.67 0.27
Belgium 1.62 4.53 0.36
Finland 2.39 4.18 0.57
France 0.75 3.93 0.19
Germany 2.01 4.75 0.42
Greece 4.89 15.03 0.33
Ireland 2.50 2.16 1.16
Italy 2.12 5.53 0.38
Luxembourg 1.06 4.82 0.22
Netherlands 0.59 3.42 0.17
Portugal 4.51 9.02 0.50
Spain 3.22 6.91 0.47
Sweden 3.08 5.63 0.55
UK 3.56 6.44 0.55
EU average (unweighted) 2.54 6.08 0.47
Bulgaria 34.71 34.50 1.01
Czech Republic 1.60 6.44 0.25
Estonia 4.16 7.98 0.52
Hungary 6.70 19.23 0.35
Latvia 11.52 12.69 0.91
Lithuania 29.99 24.92 1.20
Poland 17.09 28.97 0.59
Slovak Republic 3.19 11.02 0.29
Slovenia 87.99 37.71 2.33
CEEC average (unweighted) 21.88 20.38 0.83
Table 8 – Monthly Deposit Rates 1990-2001
Bulgaria 1991:1-2001:12, Czech Republic 1993:1-2001:12, Estonia 1993:2-2001:12,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems,
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other
practitioners in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of
analysing and understanding European financial markets, institutions and
systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises
regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes several
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located
at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate,
personal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership
currently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks.
SUERF is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership
comprises most of Europe’s Central Banks (29 in total, including the Bank for
International Settlements and the European Central Bank), banks, other
financial institutions and academics.SUERF STUDIES
1997 – 2002
1. G.M.M. Gelauff and C. den Broeder, Governance of Stakeholder
relationships; The German and Dutch experience, Amsterdam, 1997,
ISBN 90-5143-024-8.
2. Rolf Skog, Does Sweden need a Mandatory Bid Rule, a critical analysis,
Amsterdam 1997, ISBN 90-5143-025-6.
3. Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe; Transition
Management is a Tough Job. Two papers. Amsterdam, 1998, 
ISBN 90-5143-027-2.
1) Debora Revoltella, Financing Firms in East European Countries: An
Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs Approach
2) Peter H. Haiss and Gerhard Fink, Seven Years of Financial Market
Reform in Central Europe
4. Joseph Bisignano, Towards an Understanding of the Changing Structure
of Financial Intermediation; An Evolutionary Theory of Institutional
Survival, Amsterdam, 1998, ISBN 90-5143-026-4. (out of print)
5. David T. Llewellyn, The New Economics of Banking, Amsterdam, 1999,
ISBN 90-5143-028-0.
6. John Calverley, Sarah Hewin, Kevin Grice, Emerging Stock Markets
after the Crisis, Amsterdam, 2000, ISBN 90-5143-029-9.
7. Strengthening Financial Infrastructure: Deposit Insurance and Lending of
Last Resort (two contributions), Amsterdam, 2000, ISBN 90-5143-030-2.
1) Richard Dale, Deposit Insurance in Theory and Practice
2) Christian de Boissieu and Franco Bruni, Lending of Last Resort and
Systemic Stability in the Eurozone.
8. Cem Karacadag and Michael W. Taylor, The New Capital Adequacy
Framework: Institutional Constraints and Incentive Structures, Vienna,
2000, ISBN 3-902109-00-9.
9. Miguel Sebastián and Carmen Hernansanz, The Spanish Banks’
Strategy in Latin America, Vienna, 2000, ISBN 3-902109-01-7.
10. M.M.G. Fase and W.F.V. Vanthoor, The Federal Reserve System
Discussed: AComparative Analysis, Vienna, 2000, ISBN 3-902109-02-5.
8611. Willem H. Buiter and Clemens Grafe, Central Banking and the Choice
of Currency Regime in Accession Countries, Vienna, 2001, 
ISBN 3-902-109-03-3.
12. Sanjiva Prasad, Christopher J. Green, and Victor Murinde, Company
Financing, Capital Structure, and Ownership: A Survey, and Implications
for Developing Economies, Vienna, 2001, ISBN 3-902109-04-1.
13. Martin M.G. Fase, Investment in Paintings: The interaction of monetary
return and psychic income, Vienna, 2001, ISBN 3-902109-05-X.
14. Alexandre Lamfalussy, Reflections on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets, Vienna 2001, ISBN 3-902109-06-8.
15. Italian Mutual Banks: Performance, Efficiency and Mergers and
Acquisitions (two contributions), Vienna 2002, ISBN 3-902109-07-6.
1) Juan Sergio Lopez, Alessandra Appennini, Stefania P.S. Rossi,
Evidence from two different cost frontier techniques.
2) Roberto Di Salvo, Maria Carmela Mazzilis, Andrea Guidi,
Mergers and acquisitions between mutual banks in Italy: an analysis of
the effects on performance and productive efficiency.
16. Thomas Reininger, Franz Schardax, Martin Summer, Financial
System Transition in Central Europe: The First Decade, Vienna, 2002,
ISBN 3-902109-08-4.
17. Helmut Wagner, Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy,
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-09-2.
18. Luiz Fernando De Paula, Banking Internationalisation and the
Expansion Strategies of European Banks to Brazil during the 1990s,
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-10-6.
19. Is there a Future for Regional Banks and Regional Exchanges? The
Strategies of Selected Austrian Finance Institutions, (four contributions),
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-11-4.
1) David T. Llewellyn, The Future for Small & Regional Banks
inEurope
2) Reinhard Ortner, What Future for Regional Banks?
3) Herbert Stepic, The Strategy of RZB in Central and Eastern Europe
4) Stefan K. Zapotocky, The Challenges and Chances of Regional
Exchanges
20. Thomas Dalsgaard, Jorgen Elmeskov, Cyn-Young Park, Ongoing
Changes in the Business Cycle – Evidence and Causes, Vienna, 2002,
ISBN 3-902109-12-2.
21. Christian Harm, Bank Management Between Shareholders and
Regulators, Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-13-0.
8722. Jean-Paul Abraham, Peter van Dijcke, European Financial Cross-
Border Consolidation: At the Crossroads in Europe? By Exception,
Evolution or Revolution, Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-14-9.
2003
2003/1 Bert Scholtens, Dick van Wensveen, The Theory of Financial
Intermediation: An Essay on What it Does (Not) Explain, Vienna 2003,
ISBN 3-902109-15-7.
2003/2 Paola Bongini, The EU Experience in Financial Services
Liberalization: A Model for GATS Negotiation? Vienna 2003, 
ISBN 3-902109-16-5.
2003/3 Jean-Paul Abraham, Introduction by David T. Llewellyn,
Monetary and Financial Thinking in Europe – Evidence from Four
Decades of SUERF, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-902109-17-3.
Order Form: www.suerf.org
88